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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/03/2004 Accident number: 273 
Accident time: 10:05 Accident Date: 25/08/2000 
Where it occurred: Near Restelicia, Gora, 
MNB South 
Country: Kosovo 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Handling accident Date of main report: 17/09/2000 
ID original source: KC/MD/JF Name of source: KMACC 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: Fuze Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
grass/grazing area 
hard 
Date record created: 18/02/2004 Date  last modified: 18/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: DM 689 460: MGRS Coordinates fixed by: GPS 
Map east: 68954 Map north: 49047 
Map scale: Restelica Map series: M709 
Map edition: 5-NIMA Map sheet: 3178 IV 
Map name: 1:50,000  
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate training (?) 
metal-detector not used (?) 
 
Accident report 
A Mine Accident Report was prepared for the country MACC and made available in August 
2000. The following summarises its content. 
The accident occurred at a site with "several dangerous areas" recorded. The mines found 
were mainly PMA-3 and PMR-2A. TMA-5 AT mines had been present but "people from 
Albania" had removed most of them. Clearance work was progressing well "due to open 
ground and sparse vegetation" although some of the PMA-3 mines had been "affected" by 
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local people having burnt off the vegetation about three weeks previously. The ground was 
described as "semi-hard" and compacted with "small bush". A photograph showed very little 
ground cover and large areas of burnt ground. The weather was described as sunny with a 
temperature of 25C and a light breeze. 
 
 
The photograph above shows the area being worked on. 
The demining group was made up of "local Kosovo Albanians" headed by a Team Leader and 
Assistant who were both expatriates. The deminers worked a one man drill in two man teams 
(inferred) working "for 30 minutes on and 30 minutes off". The team were last visited by a 
MACC QA on the day before the accident. 
The victim was an expatriate supervisor with 24 years military experience. He had been a 
member of the demining group for a year and had been in Kosovo previously. 
Work began at the site at 08:00. At 09:50 a deminer reported having found a PMA-3 while 
prodding [no mention of detectors was made]. The victim ordered the deminers out of the field 
and went to "neutralise" the mine. He removed the UPMAH initiator from the mine and noticed 
that is was "slightly damaged". He carried the mine body in his right hand and the initiator in 
his left hand as he walked out of the mined area. At 10.05 the detonator in the initiator 
exploded in his hand. 
 
The victim called for help and his assistant and the medic went to him. The demining group's 
manager and the authorities were notified of the accident by radio. 
The photograph shows the victim’s hand during treatment. 
 
The medic examined the victim's hand and decided to evacuate him by road. The victim was 
"conscious and stable the whole time". At 11:45 they reached the KFOR hospital where a 
"small problem" with identity cards delayed their entry. 
The investigators determined that the victim had been wearing appropriate PPE but did not 






The investigators concluded that the victim "took a risk" by carrying an initiator that he had 
noticed was damaged. The demining group's SOPs state that destruction in-situ should take 
place unless it proves "to be impractical". If it did prove to be impractical, the mine was to be 
"remotely pulled " before handling. They said that there was no reason not to destroy the 
mine in-situ. They determined that the mine casing was not damaged by fire and that the 
mine had been found under the ground. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that the demining group should produce annex documents to 
their SOPs covering "each type of mine they intend to neutralise in Kosovo". When 
neutralisation was done, a special box should be provided for the "fuse" to be stored in after 
separation. They added, "only in exceptional cases should the PMA-3 mine be neutralised. 
They have an UPMAH-3 pressure friction (chemical) fuse which is very unstable." 
A final recommendation was for the MACC to address the "small inconvenience" experienced 
at the KFOR base where an absence of appropriate ID cards caused a problem.  
The MACC Programme Manager added a document requiring the demining group to make 
the changes to their SOPs recommended in the accident report. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 348 Name: Name removed 
Age: 43 Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 1 hour 45 minutes 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: not recorded (worn) 
 




No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Management/control inadequacy" because 
the demining group was operating in breach of their published SOPs. The victim was the most 
senior manager in the field, and the responsibility for his selection and training rested with 
higher management. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training”. 
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